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In December 2018, the Minister of State for Disabled People, Health and Work revealed to 
Parliament that only 140,000 Personal Independence Payment (PIP) cases had been 
officially reviewed and cleared for the given year.1 Disclosure of this meagre number (at 
the time less than 10 per cent of all applications) was preceded by a decision of the High 
Court (RF v Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3375) which found that regulations that came 
into force last year were “blatantly discriminatory” to people who were suffering from 
mental health problems. 
 
The issue that it brings to the surface is that this is an integrated benefit where the mental 
health component and the mobility component are overlapping. This has been revealed 
by the "psychological distress" suffered as a consequence of a lack of mobility of the 
claimant who has been awarded the benefit.   This paper enquires if the PIP is a social 
security provision that has been injudiciously implemented without sufficient consultation 
given its anomalies, and it argues for the need for clarity and the application of a set 
criteria for evaluation. There is also a basis to argue that it should be deemed as an 
integral mobility and mental health-based benefit with greater regard for the claimant's 
existing welfare provisions rather than a subjective reliance on the assessor's report.      
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The Department of Works and Pensions (DWP) introduced the Personal Independence 
Payment (PIP) in January 2017 to replace the Disability Living Allowance. 2 The Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP) is a form of non-contributory social security provision paid 
to people who have daily living and/or mobility needs, designed to help with the extra costs 
of living with a long-term illness or disability. They have to be eligible for 3 months and 
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1 Minister of State for Disabled People, Health and Work, Hansard, HC Series 6, Vol 651 col 82-4 WS, (20 
Dec 2018), https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-12-
20/debates/18122039000023/PersonalIndependencePayment 
2 In December 2010, the new coalition Government launched a consultation on the reform of Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA) (Cm 7984). The ministerial foreword stated: "We are steadfast in our support for 
the principles of DLA, as a non-means-tested cash benefit contributing to the extra costs incurred by 
disabled people. However, we need to ensure that the benefit reflects the needs of disabled people today, 
rather than in the 1990s. It is time that we had a disability benefit which is easier for individuals to 
understand and provides clear criteria and consistent awards". Personal Independence Payment will also be 
a more dynamic benefit – it will take account of changes in individual circumstances and the impact of 
disabilities, as well as wider changes in society, such as social attitudes and equality legislation." 




need the payment for at least 9 months until they are terminally ill. 3This is a non -means 
tested benefit which is paid regardless of income, savings, or National Insurance 
contribution record and is a tax-free benefit.  It is possible to receive PIP even if a person 
is working or studying and if a person who is a carer with care needs, it is possible to claim 
PIP and this will not reduce the Carer's Allowance.4 
 
The framework of this benefit includes a daily living component (how your mental health 
affects your daily life) and, a mobility component (how your mental health affects your 
ability to travel and make journeys). There has been controversy from the start regarding 
the claim to this benefit of those who are suffering from the mental health problems which 
require the support in their lives to cope with the disability. The recent debate has been 
characterised by the claims of applicants based on the lack of expert guidance of the DWP 
in dealing with the mental incapacity that impacts on the mobility criteria and that led to 
review and guidelines set by judges.  5 
 
The PIP regulations fall within the ambit of the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The WRA 2012 Part IV contains the 
parent power for the making of regulations to bring the new PIP scheme into effect. 
Section 77(2) provides that PIP has two components, namely the daily living component 
and the mobility component (section 77(2)). Section 79(1) provides that a person is 
entitled to the mobility component at the standard rate if the person's ability to carry out 
mobility activities is limited by his or her physical or mental condition. Section 79(2) 
provides that a person is entitled to the mobility component at the enhanced rate if the 
person's ability to carry out mobility activities is severely limited by their physical or mental 
condition. The "physical or mental condition" is not defined in the Act and Section 79(4) 
provides that the relevant mobility activities may be prescribed. Section 80(1)(c) and (d) 
provide that a person's ability to carry out mobility activities is to be determined in 
accordance with regulations. Regulations made under section 80(3) must provide that the 
ability to carry out mobility activities is to be decided on the basis of an assessment. 6 
 
The recipients of the Personal Independence Payments are also covered by the  Equality 
Act 2010 which combines previous equality legislation in England, Scotland and Wales and 
includes a new Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) that enables protection against form 
of racial, disability and gender discrimination.  This duty combines the previous public 
sector equality duties into one single duty and extends the areas of discrimination 
covered.7  The PSED have compelled the public authorities  to promote equality of 
     
3  Money Advice Service. Personal Independence Payments An Introduction.  
https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/personal-independence-payment-an-introduction#who-
can-get-pip 
4  Personal Independence Payments explained. Scleroderman  & Raynauds  UK 
https://www.sruk.co.uk/scleroderma/managing-scleroderma/person-independence-payment-
explained/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-LG9saKz6AIVRLTtCh0HugtbEAAYAiAAEgJTuPD_BwE 
5 The first statutory review into PIP was the Independent Review of the Personal Independence Payment 
Assessment (December 2014) that stated “The latest published data on PIP awards at the time of publishing 
this Report were to July 2014, when 106,400 were in payment” www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
personal-independence-payment-pip- assessments-first-independent-review 
6 These sections were brought into force on 10 June 2013. 
7 The previous Public Sector Equality Duties were the Race Equality Duty  which came into force in May 
2002; the Disability Equality Duty which came into force in December 2006; and the Gender Equality Duty 
which came into force in April 2007.  The General Equality Duty came into force. The Essential Guide to the 




opportunity and eliminate discrimination for service users and staff, rather than waiting 
for individuals to complain.   
 
Section 149(1) of the Act defines what the PSED means in terms of general and specific 
duties.  The Act places "a general duty on the public sector in the exercise of its functions, 
to have due regard to the need to: eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and 
any other conduct that is prohibited under the Act, advance equality of opportunity 
between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not 
share it, and foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and people who do not".  
 
The aim of these duties is to encourage public bodies to consider how they can positively 
contribute to the advancement of equality and good relations. Equality considerations 
should be reflected in the design of policies, the delivery of services, including internal 
policies and reviews. 8 The public bodies are national and local Government bodies 
carrying out functions for the public and include Government departments such as DWP, 
HM Revenue and Customs, etc, Local authorities, NHS bodies e.g. hospitals, transport and 
educational bodies; the police, and other bodies carrying out public functions on behalf of 
the above. 9 
 
Francine Morris, has observed that the "DWP and its agents are service providers for the 
purposes of the Equality Act 2010. This means that they must comply with the duties not 
to discriminate against, harass or victimise individuals and to make reasonable 
adjustments for disabled people to access their services. This duty applies at every stage 
of the process from application. The DWP also carries out public functions, and must 
comply with the Public Sector Equality Duty".10 
 
The PSED imposes an obligation to issue a public sector equality statement annually in 
order to substantiate that it has abided by the norms of this duty.  The legal decisions 
show the extent to which the courts hold the public bodies responsible in maintaining their 
duty. In Aaron Hunt v North Somerset Council11  the local authority was faced with 
significant reductions in funding based on their budgetary needs to consider making 
substantial financial savings in respect of providing youth services.  This was because the 
authority decided to ‘review youth service provision through promoting non-[council] 
funded positive activities, supporting transfer of responsibility to towns/parish councils 
and community groups or closing youth centres as a last resort ([ensuring] targeted youth 
support will continue for the most vulnerable)’.  
 
The Claimant argued that in approving specific budget reductions, the authority had failed 
to comply with its PSED to have regard to section 149. The judge overruled these 
     
Public Sector Equality Duty p 10 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/psed_essential_guide_-
_guidance_for_english_public_bodies.pdf 
8 Ibid, p11  
9 The complete list is in Schedule 19 of the Act. There is also provision for additional bodies specific to Wales 
(Part 2) and Scotland (Part 3). See www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/schedule/19   
10 Francine Morris, The Trials of Welfare Reform (2015) p 6-7  Equality and Human Rights Commission 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/the_trials_of_welfare_reform_0.pdf 
11 [2012] EWHC 1928 (Admin) 




objections and held the evidence showed council members did have due regard to the 
PSED when they reached their decision to approve the revenue budget.  The EIA identified 
the budget proposals which had a high impact on service-users; it dealt explicitly and in 
detail with the impact of the reduction in the youth-service budget; it referred explicitly 
to the impact on a number of the protected characteristics itemised in section 149. 
Furthermore, it disclosed information on which it based its conclusions and steps to be 
taken to minimise or mitigate that impact.12 
  
There is further evidence that the courts have developed principles in how public bodies 
should take action to comply with the PSED and the correct approach. In AA and others 
v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council13 the Sandwell Council introduced minimum two 
year residency requirements for anyone claiming Council Tax Reduction (CTR) in their 
area. This excluded three women who were exempted from this waiver and raised judicial 
review. The High Court struck down the policy on various grounds, including the failure 
with the PSED under section 149 of the Act.   
 
Mr Justice Hickinbottom ruled the two year residency rule was unlawful on six separate 
grounds. The Council acted outside its statutory powers, the rule was irrational and 
discriminated on grounds of race and gender, and the Council failed to hold any 
consultation or comply with its equality duties. The ruling stated: 
 
94. Section 149 was undoubtedly engaged: indeed, that was well- recognised by the Council, in the 
way in which it conducted an EIA at various stages before the residence requirement was tabled. 
However, there is simply no evidence that the Council conducted any assessment at all of the race 
or gender impact of the residence requirement at or before it adopted the 2013-14 CTR Scheme; and 
scant evidence that it did so prior to the 2014-15 Scheme. I do not consider that the evidence that 
there is (e.g. with regard to feedback towards the end of 2013, from wherever it came) is sufficient 
to show that the Council grappled at all with the effects of the requirement on those with the identified 
protected characteristics.   
 
95. On the evidence, I cannot but find that the Council was in breach of its section 149 duty. That 
duty is important; and, had the Council been rigorous in satisfying its obligation to have due regard 
to the relevant characteristics, then, again, it may not have proceeded with the unlawful course that 
it followed.  
 
The PIP scheme comes within the ambit of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and 
covers the Article 8 Right to a Private and Family Life. It also engages Article 14, which 
prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights and the discrimination on 
a number of grounds in "other status" which includes disability. This is when there is 
different treatment of people in the same position which will be unlawful if the different 
treatment cannot be "objectively" justified.  
 
There are some overlapping rules such as for those who may be covered by mobility but 
fall under the daily living needs  such as whether or not a person finds it hard to make a 
journey because of ‘overwhelming psychological distress.’14 The issue that has caused the 
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14 OPD means distress related to a mental health condition or intellectual or cognitive impairment resulting 
in a severe anxiety state in which the symptoms are so severe that the person cannot undertake a journey 
without being overwhelmed. The threshold is a very high one - a claimant who, without prompting, would 
be left feeling anxious, worried or emotional does not meet it. OPD may occur in conditions such as 




most controversy regarding the PIP claim is how will the affect will be determined by the 
date of the claim and the catalyst on how people with mental health conditions had been 
discriminated against. From 16 March 2017, new PIP regulations prevented an award of 
the enhanced PIP mobility rate in cases where someone cannot follow the route of a 
familiar journey without another person unless it is “for reasons other than psychological 
distress”. This meant that those with serious mental health conditions, who are unable to 
plan or undertake a journey because of overwhelming psychological distress were only 
entitled to a lower level of support, if any.  
 
There have been recent issues that have surfaced which have caused the PIP framework 
to be questioned. The fact that the DWP has allegedly discriminated against people with 
mental health conditions in the way it has dealt with their PIP claims where the mobility 
component is under consideration.  This includes the disregarding of the evidence relating 
to mental health and focusing instead on other impairments and made no attempt to seek 
medical evidence from their GP. There are also allegations that the assessors are not 
accurate about the assessment of the patient's symptoms and the medication that they 
are dependent upon.15  
 
The tribunal has to undertake a complete reconsideration of the issues that are raised by 
the appeal and, subject to the tribunal’s discretion under section 12(8)(a) of the Social 
Security Act 1998, any other issues that merit consideration. The tribunal must not take 
account of circumstances that were not obtaining at that time: see section 12(8)(b) of the 
Social Security Act 1998. Later evidence is admissible, provided that it relates to the time 
of the decision: R(DLA) 2 and 316 
 
The argument in this paper is that where psychological distress is concerned there should 
be a flexible approach towards admitting the expert evidence to be submitted at the 
tribunal and that this should include evidence of other benefits such as the Employment 
and Support Allowance (ESA) and the GP records.   
 
II. INTERPRETING 'MOBILITY' IN THE REGULATIONS 
 
The payment of PIP retains the key principles of DLA by providing welfare benefits to help 
claimants overcome the barriers which prevent disabled people from participating fully in 
everyday life. It has the objective of a fairer, more consistent and sustainable provision 
of social security. The intention is that support should be aimed at those disabled people 
who face the greatest challenges to leading independent lives. In terms of dealing with 
those who suffer from a disability relating to mobility there are provisions in the Social 
Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 201317. Descriptors c, d and f are 
relevant for the mobility component of the PIP.  
     
generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder, dementia or agoraphobia.  PIP Assessment Guide Part 2 - The 
Assessment Criteria DWP 30/9/19.  
15  PIP Assessment report being inaccurate. Scope: Equality for disabled people. 27/9/18.  
https://community.scope.org.uk/discussion/49756/pip-assessment-report-being-inaccurateUnder Section 
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(DLA) 2 AND 3/01 
16  R(DLA)2/01 (formerly CDLA/2934/1999) states that evidence obtained late must be relevant to 
circumstances obtaining at the date of decision. See also R(DLA)3/01 (formerly CDLA/4734/1999). 
17 S.I. 2013 No.377 





The Claimant is entitled to receive the benefits in these circumstances as follows:   
 
c. For reasons other than psychological distress, cannot plan the route of a journey. 
d. For reasons other than psychological distress, cannot follow the route of an unfamiliar journey 
without another person, assistance dog or orientation aid. 
f. For reasons other than psychological distress, cannot follow the route of a familiar journey without 
another person, an assistance dog or an orientation aid. 
 
Schedule 1 Part 3 contained the table for mobility activities. This provides in the Activity 
column Planning and following journeys. In the Descriptor column, if a can plan and follow 
the route of a journey unaided then they get awarded zero points; Descriptor b, Needs 
prompting to be able to undertake any journey to avoid overwhelming psychological 
distress to the claimant. The award is of 4 points; Descriptor c, Cannot plan the route of 
the journey gains 8 points; Descriptor d, Cannot follow the route of an unfamiliar journey 
without another person, assistance dog or orientation aid gains 10 points; Descriptor e, 
Cannot undertake any journey because it would cause overwhelming psychological distress 
to the claimant gains 10 points; and Descriptor f,  Cannot follow the route of a familiar 
journey without another person, an assistance dog or an orientation aid gains 12 points.  
 
The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 were amended by 
para 2(4) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 201718.  Para 2(4) provides:  
 
In the table in Part 3 (mobility activities), in relation to activity 1 (planning and following journeys), in 
descriptors c, d and f, for "Cannot" substitute "For reasons other than psychological distress, cannot. 
 
These regulations were interpreted by the tribunal reviewing appeals based on the 
infringements of these rules. In MH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) 19 
the appeal concerned the approach to the mobility descriptors, particularly mobility activity 
1.  
 
The claimant had been found to be unable to undertake any journey because it would 
cause overwhelming distress to him (descriptor 1(e)) but appealed on the ground that the 
overwhelming distress he would suffer if he went out meant that he also could not follow 
the route of a familiar journey without another person (descriptor 1(f)) and that the 
retching he would experience would make him unable to move more than 50 metres 
(descriptor 2(c)). The challenge stated the effect of these regulations was that many people 
with mental health problems and some people with learning disabilities and brain injuries 
were prevented from accessing the mobility component of PIP, even if their mental illness, 
learning disability or brain injury was so severe that they were entirely unable to travel, if 
the reason for this was psychological distress.20 
 
The Upper Tribunal Judges Rowland, Rowley and Hemingway held "that, applying 
regulation 4(2A)(a), a person who cannot walk along a pavement or cross a road safely by 
himself because he is at risk of having a fit and so needs supervision to do so, is unable 
safely to follow a route and satisfies descriptor 1f.  We consider that the same analysis 
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applies to a claimant who is unable to follow a route safely because he or she is unaware 
of dangers due to a sensory or cognitive impairment".21  
 
The Upper Tribunal referred to the ‘overwhelming’ psychological distress and although this 
term may appear to be setting  a high-or difficult-to- meet threshold, in practice, if 
someone’s psychological distress impairs their ability to mobilise outdoors to such an extent 
that they cannot plan a route, or go there unaccompanied, it should be self-evident that 
the level of distress is ‘overwhelming’.  This has had a bearing on later judgments and in 
the review that the DWP has applied it will apply in the ‘anti-test case rule’, whereby the 
outcome of a test case is only applied to other similar cases from the date of the test case 
judgment.  
 
The Court considered the application of regulation 7 to the application of the requirements 
in their regulation 4(2A), which provides that a descriptor applies only where it is satisfied 
on over 50% of the days.  The tribunal referred expressly to this requirement when giving 
its reasons for disallowing (the appellant’s) appeal. 22 It is the risk of losing their mobility 
or such an occurrence which creates the need for her to have supervision in order to be 
able to carry out the relevant descriptor safely. This meant that descriptors ‘c’, ‘d’ and ‘f’ 
could be satisfied by claimants by virtue of ‘overwhelming psychological distress’.  The 
claimant was eligible to score points under descriptor 1c, 1d or 1f if their inability to follow 
the route of a familiar journey was caused by psychological distress, even if they had the 
intellectual capacity to navigate the journey.  
 
In response to this ruling the Government amended the PIP regulations from 16 March 
2017, replacing the word ‘cannot’ in descriptors ‘c’, ‘d’ and ‘f’ with the phrase: ‘For reasons 
other than psychological distress, cannot’. This meant that claimants whose ability to plan 
and follow journeys was impaired by mental, rather than physical, health problems could 
only score a maximum of 10 points under descriptor ‘e’ and it prevented  them from an 
entitlement claim to the enhanced rate of the PIP mobility component. 
 
III. ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WITH PARAGRAPH 2(4) 
 
The concept of psychological distress has been in dispute in the context of the mobility for 
the descriptors to meet the requirements set out in the legislation. This is of considerable 
impact for claimants who, within the parameters of the Act, have been assessed as not 
suffering from psychological distress.  There is a risk that public bodies can discriminate 
against different groups of disabled people, not simply against disabled people as a whole 
by comparison with non-disabled people.     
 
These are matters that require consideration after the coming into force after the 
commencement of the substantive provisions of Part 4 of the Welfare Reform Act  2012 
and (Regulation 1(2);  , he the Human Rights Act 1998 provisions and the consultation by 
the  DWP with the  stakeholders before making the  regulations. This is because the issue 
can involve the mental health of the person in terms of their capacity and the need to be 
mobile with regard to the descriptors in the Mobility component of the allowance.  
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In RF v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Mind and Equality and Human Rights 
Commission intervening) 23  there was a challenge by a judicial review to the Social Security 
(Personal Independence Payment) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 SI No 194, which 
excluded claimants from any entitlement to the mobility activity 1 if the cause of meeting 
the descriptor is psychological distress for descriptors 1c, 1d, and 1f. 
 
Mr Justice Mostyn relied on the following three grounds in support of the application to 
quash paragraph 2(4) of the 2017 regulations.  
 
i) the 2017 regulations are in breach of the prohibition against discrimination in Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), read together with Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1; 
ii) the 2017 regulations are ultra vires Part 4 of the Welfare Reform Act 2012; and 
iii) SoS unlawfully failed to consult prior to making the 2017 regulations.24 
 
Mr Justice Mostyn considered the four-limbed test from Bank Mellat v HM Treasury25  when 
evaluating whether or not the 2017 regulations were in breach of Article 14 ECHR: firstly, 
the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected 
right; secondly, the measure is rationally connected to that objective; thirdly, a less 
intrusive measure could not have been used without unacceptably compromising the 
achievement of the objective; and finally, when balancing the severity of the measure’s 
effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the 
objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former 
outweighs the latter.26 The Court relied on the judgment in R. (on the application of MA) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions27   that this principle "no doubt that this applies 
to this social security measure" and that "this reflects the wide margin of appreciation given 
to national governments when enacting measures with a macro-economic effect". The 
common factor in these limbs was to be determined according to whether or not the 
measure is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’. 28.  
 
The objective of the paragraph 2 (4) was to save on the financial costs of PIP payments 
but Mr Justice Mostyn concluded that the measure that saving costs alone could not be 
"objectively justified, and that paragraph 2(4) of the 2017 regulations were manifestly 
without reasonable foundation" and was ultra vires. 29 The measure failed to achieve a fair 
balance between the severity of the impact on people experiencing psychological distress 
and the importance of the objective and quashed it. The other grounds of challenge were 
also satisfied in that the parent statute did not grant the power to make secondary 
legislation with this effect, which was incompatible with the purpose of the scheme as 
defined in the parent statute. There had also been any consultation before the enactment 
of this measure.30 
 
This was premised on the process of consultation that led to the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
This began with the consultation process which the government undertook before enacting 
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the legislation. The Government published its response to the consultation (Cm 8051) in 
April 2011.  At para 15 on page 4 it proposed: "There will be two components of Personal 
Independence Payment; a daily living component and a mobility component, each with a 
standard and enhanced rate."31  
 
However, there was no consultation when the process started to receive feedback for the 
definition of psychological distress. This was stated by the judge when he referred "to 
written evidence filed by the claimant and the first intervener about what specialist 
consultees were given to understand, during the period of gestation of these regulations, 
as to the scope of the "psychological distress" factor. The claimant filed witness statements 
by Ms Lambert of the National Autistic Society, Mr Butler of Disability Rights UK, Mr Anders 
of Revolving Doors and Ms Kotova of Inclusion London. The first intervener filed a 
statement from Mind's director of external relations, Ms Sophie Corlett. All of these people 
worked at organisations which contributed to the consultation process in the run-up to the 
2013 Regulations. None of them recalls being told of an intention to distinguish 
overwhelming psychological distress from other mental health issues. On the contrary, had 
the intended distinction been made clear, all of these people would have raised concerns 
and objections". 32 Mr Justice Mostyn highlighted that the intention of differentiating 
between individuals with physical and mental health issues was never communicated to 
‘the outside world’ and could not be inferred from either a literal or purposive construction 
of the original 2013 regulations. The later amendment utilising the secondary legislation 
was done by legal fiat and was not a logically connected to the legislative objective. 33 The  
judge referred to Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
which protects disabled people’s right to live independently and be included in the 
community. 34 
 
Mr Justice Mostyn held that the intention of separating the individuals with physical and 
mental health issues was never conveyed into the public domain and could not be inferred 
from the statutory interpretation of the regulations.  These  were ‘blatantly discriminatory’ 
against those with mental health impairments and which cannot objectively be justified. 35 
The regulations had been passed into law by secondary legislation. The appellant's claim 
was supported through amicus curiae interventions by the National Autistic Society, 
Inclusion London, Revolving Doors and Disability Rights UK. Mind and the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) intervened in the case as third parties supporting RF’s 
claim. 
 
In August 2017 an inquiry by the UN committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(the committee’s first ever inquiry) examined the government’s progress in becoming 
compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). 
The report found that the UK government is failing to uphold disabled people’s rights across 
a range of areas from education, work and housing to health, transport and social 
security.3612 These findings were further supported by the report of Philip Alston, the UN 
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36  www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/31/un-panel- criticises-uk-failure-to-uphold-disabled-peoples-
rights. See also Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2018) UK Poverty 2018: A Comprehensive Analysis of Poverty 




Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights in 2018.37  In January 2018 the 
Secretary State of Work and Pensions announced that the government would not appeal 
the High Court’s judgment and that it would drop its appeal against the original Upper 
Tribunal decision (MH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016]) that had 
prompted the regulations under challenge. It also undertook to review all the previous 
cases that had been decided taking this regulation into consideration that had gone against 
applicants in similar circumstances and to back date claims for payments of individuals 
effected by the decisions.38 
 
The MH approach can be integrated with the RF decision because the former referred to 
the  ‘overwhelming’ psychological distress and the later has affirmed that it could be linked 
to circumstances of mental distress generally. Although this text appears to set a high- or 
difficult-to- meet threshold, in practice, if someone’s psychological distress impairs her/his 
ability to mobilise outdoors to such an extent s/he cannot plan where s/he is going, or go 
there unaccompanied, it should be self-evident that the level of her/his distress is 
‘overwhelming’. The DWP has ordered a review which it states would link it to the ruling in 
MH, which implies that it is applying the ‘anti-test case rule’, whereby the outcome of a 
test case is only applied to other similar cases from the date of the test case judgment.39  
 
The contentious argument in all retrospective challenges would be that the DWP now 
accepts that, where applicable, points should be awarded for psychological distress from 
the date of the decision in MH or, if later, the date of claim. The backdating of arrears 
could be argued on the failure to award points under one of these descriptors because the 
cause of their impairment was mental health disability rather than physical which was a 
presumption that now should be regarded as wrong. 40 
 
IV. UNDERSTANDING MENTAL ELEMENT IN MOBILITY CLAIMS 
 
There have been several claims in which a number of Upper Tribunal decisions resulted in 
differing approaches to the interpretation of the Activity 1 descriptors for people whose 
problems with planning and following journeys stem from psychological problems such as 
anxiety and depression. The issue has been explored in the context of the Daily Living 
Activity 3 that covers “Managing therapy or monitoring a health condition” and is one of 
     
Trends and Figures. London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Last accessed 19 December 2018 at 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-poverty-2018  
37 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2018) Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom, by 
Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. London, 
16 November 2018. Last accessed 3 December 2018 at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/ 
EOM_GB_16Nov2018.pd 
38 Changes to the Personal Independence Payment eligibility criteria, House of Commons library, Steven 
Kennedy. 17/4/18. commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7911 
39 Social Security Act 1998, section 27  
40 The aftermath of the decision was that On 19 January 2018 the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
announced that the government did not intend to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal and that the 
Department for Work and Pensions will now undertake an exercise to go through all PIP cases affected by 
this judgement, with payments to affected individuals to be backdated to the effective date in each individual 
claim. Every person receiving PIP will have their claim reviewed, the DWP and a total of 1.6 million of the 
main disability benefit claims will be reviewed, with around 220,000 people expected to receive more money. 
The review could cost £3.7bn by 2023. Changes to the PIP eligibility criteria, House of Commons Briefing 
Paper, no 7911,  13 April 18 by Steven Kennedy.  researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-
7911/CBP-7911.pdf 




10 activities in the PIP assessment which, taken together, are intended to assess the extent 
of an individual’s daily living needs. 41 
 
In Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v LB (PIP) 42  the claimant had been entitled 
to the lower rate of the mobility component of disability living allowance and the middle 
rate of the care component for the period from 6 July 2013 to 16 June 2015. Prior to expiry 
of that award she was invited to make a claim for PIP, which she did by she and her partner 
completing a PIP2 questionnaire that was apparently received on 7 April 2015. This stated 
the diabetes 1, dyslexia and depression and anxiety among her conditions. The partner 
mentioned that he was constantly monitoring her blood sugar levels and encouraging her 
to eat as she could get tired and low due to the diabetes, depression and anxiety. 43 He 
helped her with food and sugar intake as her dyslexia meant she could not judge how 
much insulin to take.44   
 
The assessor who visited her at home scored on descriptors needing prompting to be able 
to read or understand complex written information (activity 8: 2 points) and for needing 
prompting or assistance to be able to make complex budgeting decisions (activity 10: 2 
points), in both cases because of her dyslexia. The claimant was not in difficulty with 
reading except for budgeting decisions but otherwise could self manage on treating herself 
for dyslexia. The total score did not achieve the threshold for payment of the PIP. The DWP 
's decision was that the claimant was not entitled to PIP because she only scored four 
points on daily living activities (below the necessary eight for the standard rate) and none 
on mobility activities. However, she was deemed to have no cognitive impairment, it was 
accepted that she struggled to understand bills due to her dyslexia and would require help 
with prompting and assistance to make a complex budgeting decision.  
 
The First tier Tribunal allowed the claimant’s appeal on papers and decided that she was 
entitled to the daily living component of PIP at the enhanced rate for the period from 17 
June 2015 to 16 June 2018 and to the mobility component at the standard rate for the 
same period. The tribunal adopted the four points accepted by the Secretary of State for 
daily living activities and in addition awarded four points for needing prompting to be able 
to take nutrition (activity 2(d)), four points for needing supervision, prompting or assistance 
to be able to manage therapy that takes more than 3.5 but no more than 7 hours a week 
(activity 3(d)), and two points for needing prompting to be able to engage with other 
people (activity 9(b)). This made a total of 14, in excess of the 12 needed for qualification 
for the enhanced rate.  
 
The Secretary of State appealed to the Upper Tribunal and in his ruling, Judge Mesher 
stated that the appeal raised “difficult questions” about the proper interpretation if the 
descriptors under two of the Daily living activities in the context of the conditions affecting 
the claimant. He stated that it "illustrates once again the gaps left in the drafting of that 
Schedule, requiring a large expenditure of effort to render its provisions coherent and thus 
making it ineffective as a simple day- to-day test of disability that needs to be applied by 
     
41 As set out in Schedule 1 of The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 ; SI 
2013/377 as amended. 
42 [2016] UKUT 0530 (AAC)    
43 Page 18 
44 Page 20 




non-lawyers". 45  He considered this to be an "anomaly" and that he was " acutely aware 
that other cases will throw up circumstances and difficulties that I have not thought of and 
which may not be catered for in a ruling made in the context of the circumstances of the 
present case. But that is so whatever interpretation I adopt.46 On balance I have concluded 
that what I have labelled alternative interpretation A (paragraphs 25 – 30 above) does the 
least damage to the intended structure of the descriptors under activity 3. It maintains 
some practical operation for the whole of descriptor 3(b)(ii) and substantially reduces the 
anomaly of claimants with more needs qualifying for fewer points than claimants with fewer 
needs".47 
 
After exploring various alternative ways of interpreting the descriptors to address the 
anomaly, Judge Mesher concluded that, even if a claimant needs extensive and time-
consuming assistance with managing medication and monitoring a health condition, s/he 
can never score more than one point under descriptor 3(b), in contrast to those who need 
help with managing therapy who can score between two and 10 points under descriptors 
3(c)(d)(e).  He held that: 
 
… descriptor 3(b)(ii) does not apply if supervision, prompting or assistance is needed for both 
managing medication and monitoring a health condition and only applies if it is needed for one only of 
those alternatives. It also does not apply if the supervision etc is needed for elements of what would 
ordinarily be regarded as therapy that go beyond either managing medication or monitoring a health 
condition within the meaning of descriptor 3(b)(ii). In both those circumstances in which descriptor 
3(b)(ii) does not apply, the case would potentially fall within the therapy provisions in descriptors 3(c)–
(f), depending on how far the supervision etc relates to something that can properly be called 
undertaking therapy and with the scale of points depending on the time for which the supervision etc 
is needed. All elements of therapy in its ordinary meaning could then be considered, including any 
taking of medication or monitoring of a health condition. If the need for supervision etc is limited to 
one or other of those alternatives in descriptor 3(b)(ii), then in order to allow the descriptor to have 
any practical application the application of descriptors 3(c) – (f) would be excluded.48  
 
The First-tier Tribunal decision was deemed to contain an error of law and was set aside. 
49 The claimant’s appeal was allowed and that she is entitled to the daily living component 
of PIP at the enhanced rate for the period from 17 June 2015 to 16 June 2018, but not 
entitled to the mobility component from and including 17 June 2015. 
 
The DWP issued an Explanatory Memorandum in the aftermath of this ruling and viewed 
the  decision to be contrary to the objectives of the legislation. It summarised the effect of 
the decision as follows:  
 
… the Upper Tribunal held that supervision, prompting or assistance to manage medication or monitor 
a health condition (which scores 1 point) may amount to supervision, prompting or assistance to 
manage therapy (which scores 2 to 8 points, depending on the number of hours support required), 
and in particular will do so where a claimant needs supervision, prompting or assistance both to 
manage medication and to monitor a health condition.  50 
 
     
45 Para 1    
46 Para 24  
47 Para 33 
48 Para 34 
49 Para 51 
50 DWP, Explanatory Memorandum to The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2017, no 194,  para 7.5. www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/194/pdf/uksiem_20170194_en.pdf  




It states further that "Regulations 2(2) and (3) 'clarify the drafting of Schedule 1 to the PIP 
Regulations to reverse these aspects of the ruling and more clearly reinstate the 
Government’s originally intended meaning'. They do so by separating out the definitions of  
'manage medication' and 'monitor therapy' and making it clear that 'monitor therapy' does 
not include receiving or administering medication (by any means), or any action which (in 
the case of the particular claimant being assessed) falls within the definition of  'manage 
medication' or 'monitor a health condition'. They also make it clear that the 1 point score 
applies even if two or more elements of the descriptor are met".51 
 
As a consequence of this ruling and Secretary of State v MH the government made changes 
to the legislation. On 23 February 2017, DWP initiated before Parliament the process to 
amend the PIP eligibility criteria from 16 March to “clarify the drafting and reverse the 
effect” of two recent Upper Tribunal judgments, which had interpreted the Schedule setting 
out the assessment criteria “in ways which the Government did not intend.”  The LB 
judgment relates to the PIP daily living activity 3 (“managing therapy or monitoring a health 
condition”); and MH considered Mobility in Activity 1, ‘planning and following journeys’. 
 
The DWP in passage the regulations, in particular the exclusion of 'psychological distress' 
from consideration in descriptors 1(c), (d) and (f), and there is much debate that there 
should have been prior consultation and debate in Parliament. The House of Lords has 
considered two motions relating to the PIP regulations following a report from the Lords 
Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that drew special attention to the regulations 
“on the ground that they give rise to issues of public policy likely to be of interest to the 
House”. 52 The Committee received submissions from a number of organisations pointing 
out the likely negative effect of the changes on claimants, particularly those with mental 
health conditions. 
 
The Lords Committee has raised the issue against the claim by the DWP that no changes 
need be made to the guidance for Healthcare Professionals undertaking PIP assessments, 
following the regulations (original emphasis). The implications of the "two significant Upper 
Tribunal decisions because the interpretation of the current descriptors was inconsistent or 
misunderstood. The wording of the descriptors has been changed, which suggests that, as 
a minimum, those making the assessments should be provided with revised guidance to 
ensure that they take proper account of the distinctions made" .53 The Committee points 
to the response from DWP at paragraph 28 above which indicates that the assessors do 
not have either the ability or the capacity to implement the Upper Tribunal decisions “in a 
safe and consistent manner”54 also indicates a need for review. 55  
 
The House of Lords have in their deliberations considered this to be a matter of public 
policy. They have shown concern with the manner in which mental health problems are 
being interpreted and their evaluation by the DWP.  It has also brought to the fore the 
issue of the lack of training of the assessors who come into contact at the earliest stage 
with the claimants that have these debilitating conditions.  
     
51 Ibid, para 7.6. 
52 Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee Twenty Seventh Report, HL 126 2016-17, 9 March 2017  
53 HL Deb 27 March 2017 cc431-2 
54 Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee Twenty Seventh Report Para 28  
55 Ibid para 33 
 








The government took a huge step in transferring from the DLA to the PIP as a welfare 
benefit that covered the social security claimants.  
 
It achieved  a major transformation when it enacted the Welfare Reform Act 2012 which 
made the DLA obsolete and put in place the Personal Independence Payment. This is an 
individualised benefit that takes into the personal circumstances of the applicant and has 
its own criteria for payment which is separate from any other benefit paid. This was 
inaugurated after a consultation that included stakeholders from different disability 
organisations and charitable organisations.  
    
This benefit can be divided into 2 components which are Living allowance and the Mobility 
allowance. These are paid at a basic and at an enhanced rate and there is an intricate 
criteria that needs to be satisfied in order to fall into the bracket which will trigger the 
payments.  They both have a nexus which is based on the mental health factor and the 
impact on the psychological effect that is responsible for the stress on those who may have 
the mobility in carrying out their tasks.   
 
The seeming urgency with which the DWP has implemented this benefit shows that they 
did not take into consideration the possible impact from the overwhelming stress that those 
who do not have problem with their mobility. It is this factor that falls within the descriptors 
that has raised the issue in the courts and which has been heard by means of litigation. 
The outcome has been that it has shown that there was incomplete consultation at its 
outset and not enough preparation went into devising its provisions The government had 
proceeded to sidestep the legislation by the statutory instrument that led to its 
interpretation that narrowed the terms under the Act.  This meant that it applied in a 
discriminatory manner and not only it breached the purpose of the legislation but also the 
Human Rights Act Article 14.  
 
The courts have now expunged that part of the Welfare Reform Act which neglected 
psychological stress and that has helped place the regulations back on track. The need is 
for the greater willingness of the Tribunals and the courts to give the claimants a greater 
benefit of the doubt in order to redress the perceived shortcomings that arise from 
inconsistent evaluation in the assessment process. This is particularly in circumstances 
where mental health is a common denominator in both the benefits under the provision.  
 
